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The Welfare Subject in the
“One-stop Shop”: Agency in
Troublesome Welfare Encounters
Kjetil Lundberg
Uni Research Rokkam Centre
The purpose of this article is to investigate the agency of “welfare sub-
jects” in welfare encounters, situated in a “one-stop shop” reform con-
text,	thereby	providing	increased	theoretical	sensitivity	into	the	field	of	
welfare	encounters’	research.	Anchored	in	a	Norwegian	reform	context,	
this article analyses agency related to welfare encounters, including wel-
fare	subjects’	attempts	to	hold	NAV	(the	Norwegian	Labour	and	Welfare	
Administration)	accountable	to	help	them.	Shifting	agency	positions	are	
located, the lines of responsibility in the welfare encounters are found 
to be unclear, and there are indications that this may contribute to the 
production of destructive agency positions.
Key words: activation, agency, one-stop shop reform, welfare encoun-
ters, welfare subject
 One-stop shop reforms have been implemented in a number 
of welfare states in recent years. Scholars of political and orga-
nizational science interpret such reforms in light of service in-
tegration and accountability aims (Askim, Fimreite, Moseley, & 
Pedersen, 2011; Byrkjeflot, Christensen, & Lægreid, 2013; Chris-
tensen, Fimreite, & Lægreid, 2013; Minas, 2014). Prior to and par-
allel to these reforms, a broad range of welfare states—liberal, 
conservative and social democratic—have reshaped their lan-
guage, philosophy and organization along the lines of individ-
ual responsibility, activation and participation (Berkel & Borghi, 
2007; Bonvin, 2008; Gubrium, Harsløf, & Lødemel, 2014; Handler 
2004; Johansson & Hvinden, 2007; Wright, 2012). As argued by 
several scholars, these two trends are inherently linked: While a 
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range of activation reforms in the 1990s were focused on chang-
ing policies and benefits, the ‘second wave of activation reforms’ 
represents a change in governance (cf. Lødemel & Moreira, 2014, 
pp. 1–2). The organizational reforms aim at putting the systems 
in better shape to deliver services. This is essential in order to 
succeed with neo-liberal activation policies promoting self-gov-
ernance, motivation and individual responsibility. 
 For the individual engaging in the welfare encounter, the 
ability to take responsibility, and to hold the system to account, 
requires rational and reflexive agency. However, people are 
not necessarily in a rational and reflexive subject position at all 
times. A particular body of literature pinpoints the complexi-
ties of agency related to the welfare subject as being relational, 
dynamic, differentiated, interconnected, interdependent, inter-
subjective and interactive (Wright, 2012; see also Greener, 2002; 
Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 2004). This literature holds potential for a 
grounded analysis of agency in welfare encounters. 
 How service users targeted for activation measures are deal-
ing with—or in—welfare encounters is a relevant aspect of social 
work and social policy. Situated in the context of the Norwegian 
NAV reform (labour and welfare reform), this paper analyzes 
agency positions in welfare encounters, related to encounters or 
sequences over some time that is attached with bureaucratic trou-
ble or tardiness.1 The empirical analysis focuses on coordination 
issues and accountability in NAV, from the standpoint of service 
users, and the production of situated agency in this setting. This 
article contributes to social work and policy research on welfare 
encounters by outlining the shifting positions of agency for peo-
ple targeted to become activated, situated within specific bureau-
cratic contexts of a one-stop shop reform.
 In what follows, I briefly present the context of the NAV re-
form in light of accountability and the “responsible citizens” 
discourse, and then outline a specific body of literature on agen-
cy which has been developed in the context of social policy and 
social work research. After presenting the study (including data 
and methods), the empirical analysis is presented in two parts 
and followed by a discussion of the themes explored. 
121Chapter TitleT e Welfare Subject in the “One-stop-Shop”
Reform Justification, Accountability
and “Responsible Citizens”
 The NAV reform was adopted by the Norwegian parliament 
in 2005, and implementation began one year later, followed by 
ambitious reform aims on behalf of the welfare subject and the 
Norwegian employment rate, as well as major organizational 
changes (Lundberg, 2012). The reform included a merger of the 
employment services and the social insurance administration, 
two central organizations in the Norwegian welfare state, and 
the coordination of the new state-level organization with the so-
cial services on the municipal level (Andreassen & Aars, 2015). 
In the political process that led to reform implementation, a spe-
cific problem representation was mobilized and gained domi-
nance—that of the multiservice user, labelled the “shuttlecock” 
(kasteball) (Syltevik, 2013). The shuttlecock was a specific kind 
of welfare subject, who needed help from more than one of the 
former welfare organizations at the same time. 
 The three welfare organizations provided different “user 
logics” in the welfare encounter, and the image of the multi-
service user being shuttled back and forth without getting the 
required help became a powerful image for poor coordination. 
The welfare services were portrayed as incapable of providing 
relevant help, resulting in passivity and dependency. The solu-
tion mobilized was organizational reform through a new one-
stop shop in order to provide integrated, holistic and “seamless” 
service provision. The reform aimed to get people back to em-
ployment and to make the services more user-friendly, holistic 
and efficient (Christensen et al., 2013).
 Organizational scholars evaluating one-stop shop reforms 
(e.g., Askim et al., 2011; Byrkjeflot et al., 2013) see them as ap-
proaches for coordinating services and improving accountabil-
ity both vertically (upwards to central government and down-
wards to citizens) and horizontally (to partners). Accountability 
may be understood as a specific social relation: “a relationship 
between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obli-
gation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum 
can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences” (Bovens, 2007, p. 450). Sullivan (2003) states that 
the more contributors there are in public decision-making, the 
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more difficult it is to specify who is accountable. As Askim et 
al. (2011, p. 1454) point out in relation to one-stop shop reforms: 
“while creating opportunities for new forms of accountability, 
[they] also pose significant challenges in terms of knowing who 
to hold accountable for what.”
 These points are actualized when observing the organiza-
tion NAV. Behind the “shop,” there are a number of other units 
and bureaus taking part in the service production, including 
casework units, call centers, special units, and a number of pri-
vate contractors providing job training, motivation, and edu-
cational programs. During the organizational reform process, 
it became increasingly clear to authorities, welfare professions, 
service users, and the general public that this new organiza-
tional structure may produce fragmentation and co-ordination 
problems of its own (Christensen et al., 2013; Ekspertgruppen, 
2015; Lundberg, 2012).
 The one-stop shops in the welfare sector are strongly re-
lated to the implementation of activation policies, and may be 
seen as a part of the second wave of activation reforms (Gubri-
um et al., 2014; Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; Minas, 2014). The re-
forms aim to activate people into employment, partly through 
a range of liberal power technologies (Barnes, 2009; Mik-Meyer 
& Villadsen, 2012). Indeed, through the discursive apparatus of 
neo-liberalism, social policy contexts and governance reforms 
have been increasingly formed by discourses such as “modern-
ization,” “efficiency,” “empowerment,” and “individual respon-
sibility.” The “responsible citizen” is increasingly expected to 
share responsibility for delivering public policy objectives by 
participating in the design, management, and governance of 
services (Barnes & Prior, 2009; Newman & Clarke, 2009a, 2009b; 
Patrick, 2014; Wright, 2012). These discourses influence public 
debates, policy making and social work practices in Norway 
and elsewhere (Jessen & Tufte, 2014; Johansson & Hvinden, 
2007; Kjørstad, 2005; Nilssen, 2014; Syltevik 2013). 
 As stated above, for individuals to be responsible actors—
and to be able to hold the one-stop shop accountable—requires 
rational and reflexive agency. In this paper, welfare subjects’ 
agency positions are analyzed within the context of welfare 
encounters during a one-stop shop reform accompanied by 
strengthened activation policies. In this regard, the concept of 
agency must be revisited. 
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Conceptualizing Agency
 Agency is a highly contested concept within the social sci-
ences. In the field of social welfare, many authoritative voic-
es have put forward an understanding of agency that is more 
moralistic than analytical (for an overview, see Deacon & Mann 
1999, p. 423). According to Barnes (2000), social theory has 
borrowed such concepts as agency and choice from everyday 
discourse, where actions are characterised as voluntary rather 
than caused. Agency is a concept commonly used to “character-
ize individuals as autonomous, purposive and creative actors, 
capable of a degree of choice” (Lister, 2004, p. 125). As Lister 
(2004) points out, there is a fine line between acknowledging 
people’s agency, including the capacity to make mistakes and 
bad decisions (as everyone does), and blaming them for their 
misfortune. In focusing on agency, there is also a risk of ro-
manticizing and idealizing. Within the research literature, the 
models of agency applied can be very different. Deacon (2004) 
highlights three distinct agency models: (1) choice-making in a 
quasi-market (cf. Le Grand, 2003); (2) moral subjects acting as 
interdependent and relational beings (cf. Hoggett, 2001; Lister, 
2004); and (3) choice-making relating to welfare dependency. 
For the purpose of this article, I am inspired by the related and 
overlapping agency typologies developed by Lister (2004) and 
Hoggett (2001), as these typologies are applicable to the context 
of welfare encounters, and their understanding of agency is 
carefully situated within structure. 
 Lister distinguishes between different types of agency, 
ranging from strategic to everyday agency and from personal 
to political/citizenship agency. She labels these different types 
of agency (relating to poverty) as “getting by,” “getting (back) 
at,” “getting out,” and “getting organized.” Hoggett distin-
guishes between different models of agency and warns about a 
“lop-sided model of agency which is insufficiently sensitive to 
the passionate, tragic and contradictory dimensions of human 
experience” (Hoggett, 2001, p. 37). People do not necessarily act 
rationally nor reflexively at all times. Inspired by Freud, Hog-
gett sees people’s self as split in multiple fractions. 
 In practice, then, people may have multiple selves. He pres-
ents a quadrant of four agency models (within the discussion of 
welfare subjects), one of which is Giddens’ (1984) reflexive and 
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successful actor (reflexive	subject). Reflexivity, as Giddens sees it, is 
a positive capacity that provides constructive agency. However, 
people can be highly reflexive and yet still feel powerless about 
their situation (reflexive	 objects). Hoggett also problematizes re-
flexivity and speculates whether all agency is reflexive, or rather 
that much reflexivity actually happens post hoc, after one has 
acted (non-reflexive	subjects). When people’s confidence, respect or 
esteem is attacked, they do not necessarily resist. The experience 
of powerlessness, resulting from poverty, marginalization and 
domination of various sorts may lead to depression and aggres-
sion being turned towards oneself (non-reflexive	objects).
 Both Hoggett (2001) and Lister (2004) underline that their 
types and models of agency should be seen as continuums of 
situations or events rather than personal character traits. They 
also add a distinction between first-order and second-order 
agency. First-order agency refers to playing the system or making 
limited change for oneself; second-order agency refers to chang-
ing the system (including political agency). Hoggett encourages 
a focus on second-order agency in social policy studies, while 
Greener (2002, p. 703) encourages a focus on first-order agen-
cy (game playing within clear rules) in welfare encounters “in 
an attempt to achieve at least some level of greater transpar-
ency and accountability in the administration of benefits.” In 
this article, I am concerned with individual/first-order agency. 
Nevertheless, agency should not then be seen as isolated from 
structure (Barnes, 2000). People act and make choices in various 
circumstances, and their actions may be grounded in a range of 
different identities, moral obligations, and moralities, and may 
also be constrained by external factors. It is therefore an import-
ant task for academics in the fields of welfare, social adminis-
tration, and social work to produce “a more nuanced account 
of agency as situational and variable, produced and negotiated 
through contextualized interaction” (Wright, 2012, p. 313).
The Research
 The objective of the research project was to explore service 
users’ experiences of their encounters (in a broad sense) with 
the new organization, NAV, during the reform process, thereby 
enabling an exploration of the reforming organization through 
these experiences. The research project aimed to cover insights 
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from service users who were in the center of NAVs mandate, 
which were targeted for activation measures and that the NAV 
reform was said to better address. Interviewees were recruit-
ed with assistance from two local NAV offices in two different 
municipalities which sent invitation letters to service users re-
ceiving rehabilitation allowances, sick leave benefits, and un-
employment benefits, and from the NAV unit “Intro og kval-
ifisering” (see Lundberg 2012 for more details). I interviewed 
29 people (22–66 years old) who were involved with NAV as 
service users and benefit recipients, and who had wide-rang-
ing backgrounds with regard to former employment, as well 
as social and medical history. All interviewees had mixed ex-
periences with NAV, and all interviewees had experiences that 
could be related to the reform process which was ongoing at 
the time of the interview. The majority of the interviewees were 
receiving vocational rehabilitation allowances at the time of the 
interview. This group turned out to be useful informants in the 
study because of the breadth and duration of their experiences 
with NAV, consisting of multiple encounters that highlighted 
the situated aspects of agency.
 Memory might be biased, and interviewees’ accounts may 
be self-protective or self-righteous to some degree. As Hoggett 
(2001) notes, much reflexivity may also happen post hoc. Indi-
viduals may or may not be able to reflect on their agency or 
the lack of such agency within specific contexts. These are valid 
points, but qualitative interviews are still often the most acces-
sible way of exploring lived experience.
 I began my empirical investigations by locating the problem-
atic of the everyday world of the actors that I was interested in 
studying (Smith, 1987). This is a methodological and analytical 
choice that privileges the individual informant’s point of view, 
and that affects my focus on the organization, which becomes 
more indistinct than, for instance, in mainstream organization-
al research analysis (see, e.g., Askim et al., 2011). By exploring 
the subjects’ experiences and points of view, fragments of the 
NAV bureaucracy and how the individual has acted towards 
the system are visualised.
 Interview transcriptions were analyzed in several stages. 
Anchored in thematic analysis, the study has resulted in pub-
lications on a number of subjects relating to welfare reform, 
individual–system relations, health/illness and work ethics and 
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stigmatization (see Lundberg, 2012). In this article, I particularly 
focus on agency in welfare encounters. I have therefore chosen 
examples from the data in which I find purposeful to illustrate 
the situatedness, complexity and contextuality of agency posi-
tions. To give insights to the multiple elements of shifting and 
situated agency when dealing with NAV, the illustrations in this 
article are chosen from the experiences of service users who all 
have experiences with former administrations (to varying de-
grees), have been employed for years prior to their need for ser-
vices from NAV, and have faced multiple problems related to 
unemployment and illness. 
Navigating in a Fragmented System
 The individual—NAV relationships are contextual and there-
fore variable, but NAV has certain ways of responding to the in-
dividual request that imply accountability issues. A general ac-
count that many of the interviewees in the study shared was the 
image of NAV as being a chaotic and fragmented organization 
that was challenging to navigate. Although this was a theme with 
variations and nuances, one common experience concerned the 
shifting of caseworkers. Jonas turned to NAV after a combination 
of unemployment and a broken arm. In the process of deciding 
an appropriate form of activation, he experienced five caseworker 
changes. For people on benefits linked to demands for activation, 
contact with caseworkers may be crucial. For Jonas, it was critical 
to have an available caseworker to hold to account at this time. 
Post hoc, he reflects on the responsibility relationship regarding 
caseworkers and the system:
The last one didn’t have anything to apologise for because 
she didn’t even know I’d been waiting. All the Post-its stuck 
on top of the other Post-its saying, ‘Call him about a meeting’, 
that’s where the mistake was. (Jonas, 30s)
 Jonas’ experience indicates accountability issues linked to 
whom to hold accountable (Askim et al., 2011; Sullivan, 2003). 
However, the issue is more complex than the mere shifting of 
caseworkers at the local NAV offices. Most of the informants 
learned that their caseworkers were constrained by what 
happened at the regional casework units. This represented an 
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organizational change: In the former offices, the service users 
mostly dealt directly with the very same employees who pro-
cessed their cases. Ideally, this new internal division of labour 
in the “seamless” NAV system should not be a concern for ser-
vice users (Askim et al., 2011). However, for the individual deal-
ing with several caseworkers at the local NAV office, as well as 
several units in the system, it is often hard to know whom to 
hold accountable for what. 
 The individual–system relationship cannot be evenly bal-
anced. The individual welfare subject has more insights into 
his/her situation and needs than does the system, while the 
system has more insights into its resources and measures. In 
complex cases—which those involving activation often are—
information becomes a critical resource for the individual ser-
vice user. Hildegunn, a former teacher in her early 50s who 
suffered from serious illness, experienced the critical issue of 
poor information first hand. She was changing from sick-leave 
benefits to vocational rehabilitation, but her caseworker asked 
her to delay applying so that her health condition could be eval-
uated. Hildegunn was assured that she had time to wait, but 
when she finally applied, she got a letter from the NAV case-
work unit informing her that the casework process would take 
three months: 
When I received that letter, I just felt (…). I was just irate. First, 
it was just so disrespectful. I felt … how could they do such 
a thing? I had done everything properly. So I called them—I 
was calm and explained the situation to them. They told me 
that, well, that’s the way it is, it will take approximately three 
months. I asked what I should do when the sick-leave bene-
fits ran out, as I wouldn’t have a penny to live on. Nothing. 
Well, I could apply for social benefits, they said. Then, I got 
so angry. I had done everything properly in order to get what 
I was entitled to in time; this is not my fault, it’s their fault. 
(Hildegunn, early 50s)
 Hildegunn felt that she was treated with courtesy in her en-
counter with NAV on the phone, even though the employee at 
the call center could not help her solve her problem. She was en-
couraged to send a “service complaint” to NAV, which she did, 
although 18 months later, she still had not received a response. 
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Furthermore, she was referred to a different part of the NAV 
system—the social services, for immediate help. 
 Hildegunn was not eager to apply for social benefits, which 
she felt carried stigma and humiliation. She felt a lack of options 
in the situation, which was ultimately solved by way of a private 
loan from a family member. This aspect of “everyday agency” 
represents relational and interconnected agency (Wright, 2012), 
a resource obviously not available for all service users in sim-
ilar situations. Following Titterton (1992), Lister (2004, pp. 130–
131) sees personal, social and material coping resources as an 
unequally distributed yet important aspect of “getting by.” By 
viewing Hildegunn’s activation of family resources in this light, 
one can grasp the aspect of agency in this situation, although 
she described herself as being powerless in the situation. 
 One aspect of agency in welfare encounters relates to so-
cial goodwill from employees (Dubois, 2010). The issue of social 
goodwill is interesting, as it may depend on specific individual 
relationships. It also shows the negotiated and interconnected 
dimension of agency between service users and case-workers 
(Barnes & Prior, 2009; Wright, 2012). Aslaug, who was in her 50s, 
experienced a high level of service provision in her encounter 
with NAV. She even obtained the direct phone number of her 
caseworker in the casework unit so that she would not have to 
phone the call center if she had problems filling out her forms. 
This is a service imbued with certain exclusivity. Having been 
a caseworker in the public sector herself for many years, she 
understood “the language of administration,” as she put it. Her 
knowledge may be seen as a cultural coping resource (Lister, 
2004; Titterton, 1992) that helped her in the welfare encounter. 
 Social goodwill from caseworkers comes in several forms. 
One of the activation technologies deployed by NAV to serve 
people undergoing vocational rehabilitation is a standardized 
electronic “employment status form” (ESF), which service us-
ers have to submit electronically every two weeks. Einar, who 
was in his 40s, received benefits because of complex personal 
problems involving serious mental illness and difficulties deal-
ing with deadlines and money, which had resulted in a diffi-
cult financial situation. In periods of serious depression, Einar 
failed to manage the ESF, and so his benefits stopped. Therefore, 
his caseworker began to manage the ESF for him. At one point 
Einar’s caseworker was replaced. As a result, the ESF was not 
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submitted during a period where he was severely depressed to 
the point of rarely even getting out of bed. His benefits were cut 
and his bills went unpaid. Einar explains:
Suddenly the benefits stopped. (…) The last thing they told 
me was that I didn’t have to send in these forms, as I’d had 
problems with that. (…) I’d gotten a new caseworker without 
them letting me know, and she didn’t take care of it [admin-
ister his ESF]. And it took a while before I discovered it. (…) 
It was apparently a problem with communication in the NAV 
system, but I was the one who got burnt. (Einar, 40s)
 Einar suffered from depression at the time. This is a condi-
tion that Hoggett (2001, p. 47) describes as a “collapse of agen-
cy.” However, his first caseworker’s goodwill enabled Einar to 
be kept secure financially. This was an act with substantial con-
sequences for Einar’s life situation at the time, and illustrates 
the relational aspect of agency (Wright, 2012). 
Welfare Subjects as Customers, Salesmen,
Quasi-bureaucrats and Frustrated Citizens
 At the time when Jonas (introduced above) experienced fre-
quent caseworker changes, his case was at a critical point. For 
the purpose of illustrating the (sometimes) dynamic nature of 
agency positions, I will here focus on the step before, when he 
was granted vocational rehabilitation in the first place:
I had spent quite a bit of time online really, to check all my 
rights. And I knew those things well (…). It’s really very 
quick, all the consultations, but that’s because I had prepared 
myself so well, and that is what they said as well. I had read 
all my rights, everything I was supposed to do, up front. And 
I was a very pleasant customer for them … or user. Right? 
Plain and simple. And they told me so. (Jonas, 30s)
 The role Jonas describes taking on is very much in line with 
Hoggett’s (2001) “reflexive subject” and Lister’s (2004) “strategic 
agency.” Jonas describes himself preparing for the meeting and 
looking into what kind of agency he has in the situation, learn-
ing the codes of the system. Perhaps coincidentally, he even 
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describes himself as a customer, a term not commonly used in 
the Norwegian welfare policy context. Although not in a cus-
tomer role where he can choose between different providers in 
a market, his term of choice may reflect a mentality, a specific 
orientation towards the public services that may have helped 
him, as he does not feel any stigma, shame or embarrassment. 
On the contrary, he comes with high expectations of what the 
system can do for him. 
 While such expectations may illustrate a customer mental-
ity, or at least an ideal actor making choices in a welfare “qua-
si-market” (Le Grand, 2003), his behaviour may also be seen 
as taking the role of a salesman, as he explains, justifying and 
selling his case to NAV in order to get access to the services 
and resources he wants. This form of “making out” (Greener, 
2002; Hoggett, 2001) relates to an important aspect of account-
ability: the actor has an obligation to explain and justify his/her 
actions. Jonas expected NAV to do so. Although he faced diffi-
culties closing the contract with NAV, he managed to get what 
he wanted, namely the funding of two years of education at a 
private learning institution.
 Before getting the final approval from NAV regarding his 
choice of education, Jonas was faced with shifting casework-
ers who failed to prepare his case. In this situation, his roles as 
customer and/or salesman had shortcomings. He tried asking 
different units in NAV for help, including his local NAV office 
and the call center. He kept calling, and kept going down to the 
office, insisting on being helped. Newman and Clarke (2009b) 
have shown how subversion of identities (such as service user, 
consumer, activist, citizen) may be used by individuals in order 
to exert their power. Jonas’ change of strategy, then, demon-
strates the dynamic side of agency. 
 Acts of subversion in order to make the system adapt to 
them and their needs took several forms in the narratives of 
the participants in this research. Some interviewees told stories 
that involved engaging help from actors outside the NAV sys-
tem, such as their union, and in one case, a social worker at 
a hospital who helped by mobilizing a doctor to write a letter 
of recommendation to handle the individual’s request for vo-
cational rehabilitation as quickly as possible (Lundberg, 2012). 
These are acts of “getting by” and “playing the system” (Lister, 
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2004), reminding us of the sometimes interconnected and situa-
tional dimensions of agency (Wright, 2012). 
 Some of the interviewees also referred to situations where 
they tried to coordinate different units within the system. Case-
workers at the local NAV office might ask service users to con-
tact the casework unit for help. At a certain point, service users 
would try to make the different NAV units communicate with 
each other. In this case, they were trying to coordinate different 
“hands” in the system to work together. In doing so, they often 
referred to NAV’s written guidelines, which require a level of 
agency relating to a sense of bureaucratic competence and re-
flexive agency (Hoggett, 2001).
 Such acts may lead to taking positions as quasi-bureaucrats. 
Erna, a former teacher in her 40s, with a long career as a welfare 
subject in former and current welfare organizations, exempli-
fies this role clearly. She had learned a whole repertoire of tricks 
and skills to deal with the system, having experienced a variety 
of practices, including several bureaucratic errors that had led 
her into difficulties. I asked her if she thought it was difficult to 
manage the bureaucratic procedures:
No, I’m totally into that stuff, that’s no problem at all. It’s rep-
etition, repetition. However, that’s where they try to catch 
you: ‘Perhaps your documentation is not in order?’ Not at all. 
(Erna, 40s)
 Occasionally she had experienced a delay in the processing 
of her case because NAV had lost her documents. Therefore, she 
started to take a copy of all the papers she handed in to NAV, 
and when talking to NAV on the phone, she made notes and 
asked for the names of the people to whom she was talking. In 
this way, she developed a routine and acted according to the 
role of a quasi-bureaucrat. This represents a particular every-
day agency strategy developed from a particular bureaucratic 
context of the failings of the bureaucracy.
 At one point, Erna submitted a receipt to get a refund for a 
tuition fee. Eventually, she went down to her local NAV office to 
ask why she had not yet received her money. The employee at 
NAV said that they had not received any receipt:
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I take a copy of all papers I hand in to them. When I hand it 
in, I demand that they stamp it. They … (say) okay, but they 
don’t like it. And I say, ‘And ideally, I’d like your name, too.’ 
(laughs) One time I handed in a receipt for some tuition mon-
ey. (…) After a few weeks, I went down and I asked them why 
the money hadn’t come. And they asked me where I handed it 
in, because they couldn’t find the receipt. I handed it in here, I 
said, so you must have lost it. ‘Nothing gets lost here’, she told 
me. ‘Well, if you believe that, that’s fine’, I told her, ‘but you 
can have a new copy from me, with the NAV stamp on it.’ You 
should have seen her then. She got mad. (Erna, 40s)
 This example of the welfare subject acting as a quasi-bu-
reaucrat represents a form of agency that could be interpreted 
as “getting by,” which is not too different from the reflexive sub-
ject position Jonas assumed (analyzed above). However, in this 
case the welfare encounter takes place in a social context where 
Erna’s actions may also be understood as “getting (back) at” the 
system by beating it at its own game (Lister, 2004). The account 
shows a lack of trust and negative expectations regarding the 
system’s capability to manage Erna’s request, guided by expe-
rience. Her act makes NAV accountable by documenting their 
errors through the same textual devices that the system itself 
deploys in the management of its tasks. 
 As illustrated, these welfare subjects do not remain passive; 
they are active actors trying to solve bureaucratic issues and 
to make the system accountable to them. Some of them do this 
with greater success than others, and their agency positions 
may shift in different bureaucratic contexts. A number of more 
or less strategic attempts to activate NAV to be accountable in 
order to sort out bureaucratic errors are identified in Lundberg 
(2012). One interviewee described simplifying his case so that 
he would be treated more smoothly in the system, even though 
he knew he might be on the edge of the law in doing so. Anoth-
er interviewee reported that in order to get sympathy from his 
caseworker and perhaps a quicker processing of his case when 
his pension was mistakenly stopped, he lied about his current 
economic situation (Lundberg, 2012). Such moves may be mor-
ally questionable, but they may represent a rational action strat-
egy in the moment. 
 Einar, quoted above, felt a need to develop a relationship 
with his new caseworker in order to give her insight into his 
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current (variable) health situation. Unfortunately, he had trou-
ble getting in touch with her:
I was told that I’d been assigned a new caseworker. And that 
caseworker, I’ve still never actually met her. I’ve been down 
(to the office) many times now; it’s been over a year. (…) I’ve 
asked, I’ve called, I’ve been down there several times and told 
them that I want to talk to her, I’ve sent letters and emails, I’ve 
emailed her superior and referred to the attempts that I’ve 
made to get in touch. And I’ve asked her to get in touch with 
me and … At one point; I heard that she was moving over to 
a different job, and that they thought that was why she hadn’t 
contacted me. (Einar, 40s)
 As indicated, these accounts, which highlight the position 
of the “reflexive object,” are common in the data. Furthermore, 
several interviewees tried to overrule their caseworker by ask-
ing the management at their local NAV office to assign a new 
caseworker. As service users do not have a formal right to 
change their caseworkers, this may or may not work, depend-
ing on the social goodwill of the management. Service users 
may also use their voice by making formal complaints. At one 
point, Erna sent a formal complaint to NAV’s complaint unit re-
garding failing casework procedures, loss of documents, and 
failure to process her case on time, as well as several experienc-
es of bad service. She sent a lengthy letter and was disappointed 
with the short, formal letter she received in reply.
 When welfare subjects feel that they repeatedly “hit a wall” 
within the system, there is the danger that over time, they ex-
perience a “failure of recognition” and frustration, which may 
lead to uncontrolled anger (Hoggett’s non-reflexive subject) or 
even mental illness, such as depression (Hoggett’s non-reflexive 
object). Erna sometimes struggled to control her anger:
I had high blood pressure and felt totally miserable, and I was 
short of breath and short tempered. So then I started to get 
back at them. I banged on tables and counters. (…) I remember 
that I told them (loudly): ‘Where is the merger? Where is this 
fantastic merger between you? Where is it? You’re more distant 
than ever before!’ (…) You’re in a very vulnerable situation and 
kind of fighting, sort of on the margins of society. I faced some 
kind of opposition to getting my rights. (…) It’s horrible to say 
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it, but I understand if someone goes berserk at the NAV office. 
I’d go so far as to say I understand the mechanism inside the 
human being when they finally… yes. (Erna, 40s)
 In the interview, Erna illustrated perhaps all four of Hog-
gett’s (2001) types. In the account above, she reflects on the long-
term consequences of suffering and “the real experiences of 
powerlessness” (Hoggett, 2001) after years of fighting a system 
that does not seem accountable to her. Her understanding of 
the mechanisms that make people snap or lose control of their 
emotions at the local NAV office indicates a painful realization 
of this point. 
 This point is relevant when evaluating threats and violence 
in welfare encounters. Since 2012, the Norwegian media and 
the national management of NAV have placed the problems of 
violence and threats from service users on the agenda, report-
ing an increase in threats and violence towards employees (e.g., 
Stavanger Aftenblad, 2013). In the summer of 2013 these issues 
also took a dramatic turn as a NAV employee died after being 
knife-stabbed on duty (Aftenposten, 2013). Threats and violence 
represent serious work environment issues for frontline work-
ers in work and welfare agencies. In the research literature on 
welfare encounters, violence from welfare subjects is interpret-
ed as a last resort for the underprivileged, as “the argument of 
those who have run out of arguments” (Dubois 2010, p. 167). 
Many of these actions also have a psychosocial dimension that 
can be understood as non-rational, “bad agency” (Hoggett, 
2001; Wright, 2012). 
Conclusion
  While the intentions of the NAV reform, one of the largest 
reforms in Norwegian welfare state history, were oriented to-
wards service integration, many service users experienced a 
reproduction of dysfunctions in the new organization (see An-
dreassen & Aars, 2015; Ekspertgruppen, 2015; Lundberg, 2012). 
Problems illustrated in this paper include shifting caseworkers 
and various systemic errors related to information flows and 
coordination issues. As stated in the introduction, the paper 
aims to answer how service users perceive challenges with 
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coordination and fragmentation, and what kinds of agency 
positions are produced or required in this setting. 
 In the welfare subject–welfare system relationship, the in-
dividual is accountable to NAV through a range of duties, and 
the system has a range of routines, techniques and resources 
to sanction the individual if he/she does not carry them out. 
Requests from service users are treated within the system’s ad-
ministrative and institutional frameworks, technologies and 
bureaucratic procedures. Service users may complain through 
NAV’s internal system, or they could make their voice heard 
in the media or by contacting politicians, ombudsmen or ser-
vice user representatives. As shown in this article, they also 
try to make the system accountable to help them by referring 
to official guidelines, by acting as coordinators and quasi-bu-
reaucrats, and by selling their case. An individual may take 
different and shifting positions in different situations, and the 
ability to do so is often required in order for the welfare subject 
to achieve favorable outcomes. Those who manage to contribute 
to constructive encounters leading to successful outcomes for 
themselves demonstrate agency as reflexive subjects. 
 Welfare encounters may be sites for social investments for 
some and sites for marginalization processes for others. As 
shown in the analysis, reflexivity is also needed in order to cope 
in simple in-the-moment situations in everyday welfare encoun-
ters. As I have illustrated, some of these coping strategies may 
turn into resistance. As Hoggett (2001) states in his seminal pa-
per, welfare institutions do not exist exclusively through the in-
teraction between individuals. The individual may experience 
the welfare state as a helping hand or as a closed fist. In that 
regard, the institutional apparatus of the welfare state under 
strengthened activation policies may contribute in producing 
“bad agency.” 
 The analyses in this article have shown tensions being re-
produced in the context of a one-stop shop reform linked to “the 
second wave of activation reforms” (Lødemel & Moreira, 2014; 
Minas, 2014). The empirical descriptions are in line with the 
findings of a recent and thorough report on NAV and its users 
(Ekspertgruppen, 2015). While the aims of providing integrated 
services and getting more welfare subjects into paid employ-
ment are yet to be realized, a straightforward answer to how the 
lessons from the NAV reform will influence Norwegian social 
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policy in the time to come is not easy to find. On a general level 
there is strong support for the Norwegian welfare model, but 
organizational reforms that are unable to fulfil their goals may 
clear the path for new answers to policy issues. 
 Recently, the lessons from the NAV reform have been mobi-
lized by the current (right-wing) government’s announcement 
of an implementation of more “flexible” labor legislation. One 
of the main policies in the new legislation will allow more, and 
longer, temporary employment contracts. These plans, which 
mark a shift in the Norwegian model, are backed by the argu-
ment that NAV is unable to help people with disabilities into 
employment (Arum, 2013). According to the proponents of the 
new policies, people with disabilities and people with scarce 
work experience will be able to get a foot in the door if employ-
ers can take them on temporarily, to try before they buy. In this 
way, failures of the NAV reform are mobilized to usher in policy 
changes in the neighboring policy field of labor legislation. 
 The lessons from the reform may also be used in other ways. 
Policy makers and other stakeholders aiming for quick solutions 
may announce welfare reforms more heavily grounded in sym-
bolic politics of individual responsibility. This discourse, linked 
to an agency model of choice-making related to welfare depen-
dency (see Deacon, 2004), may contribute to “othering” of under-
privileged groups (Lister, 2004) in order to push forward a less 
inclusive-oriented and more disciplinary activation regime. This 
may produce frustrated citizens and destructive agency posi-
tions. Therefore, in order to hold policy makers accountable for 
their decisions, they need to be reminded that the welfare state 
should function as a security net, even for those who are not ca-
pable of a rational, reflexive subject position at all times. 
Endnotes
1As elsewhere, the terms used to describe those targeted by welfare 
organisations are shifting away from, for example, “client” and “claim-
ant.” Currently in Norway, “user” is the politically correct term, in 
what is partly an effort to avoid stigma (Lundberg, 2012, 2013). The term 
“customer,” which is favored in, for example, Britain’s Jobcentre Plus, 
has never dominated in Norway. 
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